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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the wake of the 2008 financial collapse, Congress enacted the 
Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–
Frank).1  Section 922 (the whistleblower provision) of Dodd–Frank 
establishes the parameters of the new Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) whistleblower program.2  The whistleblower 
provision has changed the regulatory landscape in which businesses 
operate and has provided incentives for whistleblowers to come forward 
with information relating to potential regulatory violations.  Since 
enactment, attorneys have been deciphering how the post-Dodd–Frank 
environment will function.  The general business consensus toward the 
new provision is reflected in the words of former Congressman and co-
author of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act,3 Mr. Michael G. Oxley: 
Most of Dodd–Frank affects financial companies, but this is an area 
which hits all public companies, as well as companies that are subject to 
federal securities laws.  In my estimation, the law goes too far, because it 
not only accommodates whistleblowers, but actually incentivizes them to 
go outside the structure of the company.  Dodd–Frank significantly 
reduces the effectiveness of internal due process and may, in practice, 
eliminate it in these instances, as it accelerates potential regulatory and 
legal proceedings.  I think we had it right in Sarbanes–Oxley, which, in 
my view, struck a better balance between the rights of whistleblowers and 
the interests of companies to manage internal financial processes.4 
While the reach of Dodd–Frank is substantial, this Comment goes 
 
 1. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 2. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6 (West 2010). 
 3. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered 
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C).  The Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) was the first statute that 
provided retaliatory protection for whistleblowers at the federal level and required internal controls for 
businesses.  See generally Jennifer Christian, Note, Whistleblower Protection Under Sarbanes–Oxley: 
Key Provisions and Recent Case Developments, 31 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 331 (2006).  Some believe 
that Dodd–Frank’s whistleblower provision has contradicted the policy of SOX.  See, e.g., Dave 
Ebersole, Comment, Blowing the Whistle on the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions, 6 ENTREPREN. 
BUS. L.J. 123, 138 (2011) (“By incentivizing external reporting to the detriment of internal compliance, 
Dodd–Frank contradicts the policy behind SOX 404 provisions promoting effective internal control 
systems.”). 
 4. E-mail from Mr. Michael G. Oxley, Of Counsel, Baker & Hostetler LLP, former 
Congressman and Chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, to author (Oct. 28, 2011, 14:54 
EST) (on file with author) [hereinafter E-mail from Mr. Michael Oxley]. 
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against the general business consensus and argues that Dodd–Frank does 
not go far enough with regard to how the whistleblower provision is 
applied to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).5  Dodd–Frank 
imposes statutory roadblocks and administrative hindrances that will 
prevent the whistleblower provision from contributing to the 
enforcement of the FCPA.  It is a wonder if Congress fully understood 
or even contemplated the effect Dodd–Frank would have on FCPA 
enforcement prior to Dodd–Frank’s enactment. 
Dodd–Frank’s whistleblower provision rests on sound principles in 
that it recognizes the importance of including private citizens in 
detecting financial crimes, but private citizens can contribute more than 
being mere informants.  The solution, as argued in this Comment, is for 
Congress to amend the FCPA to include a qui tam provision that would 
allow people to sue FCPA violators on behalf of the government and for 
themselves, thereby enforcing the FCPA more effectively.6 
Part II of this Comment provides a brief overview of relevant 
background information.  Part III elaborates on the shortcomings of 
Dodd–Frank as applied to the FCPA.  Part IV makes the case for a qui 
tam provision within a revised FCPA.  Part V concludes with a call to 
action. 
II. BACKGROUND 
In order for one to appreciate the crux of this Comment, one must 
first understand two statutes (Dodd–Frank and the FCPA) and one legal 
mechanism (a qui tam provision).  Brief background information on 
each is provided below.  Dodd–Frank is discussed first, followed by qui 
tam provisions and the FCPA. 
A. Dodd–Frank’s Whistleblower Provision 
President Barack Obama signed Dodd–Frank into law on July 21, 
2010, implementing what has been deemed the most sweeping financial 
reform since the Great Depression.7  The statute affects a number of 
different areas of law, but implicates the FCPA through the 
whistleblower provision.8 
Generally stated, the whistleblower provision provides any member 
 
 5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78dd-3 (2006).  The FCPA is a statute prohibiting foreign 
bribery and is discussed more fully infra Part II.C. 
 6. Qui tam provision background information is discussed infra Part II.B. 
 7. See Recent Legislation, Dodd–Frank Act, Pub L. No. 111-203, § 922, 124 Stat. 1376, 1841-
49 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78U-6), 124 HARV. L. REV. 1829 (2011). 
 8. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6 (West 2010). 
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of the public, a bounty between ten to thirty percent, if they provide new 
information to the SEC that ultimately leads to an enforcement action 
over one million dollars.9  The whistleblower provision applies to any 
SEC judicial or administrative action, which includes FCPA actions.10 
Legislative history indicates that Congress included the whistleblower 
provision to “motivate those with inside knowledge to come forward 
and assist the Government to identify and prosecute persons who have 
violated securities laws and recovery money for victims of financial 
fraud.”11  Citing testimony of whistleblower Harry Markopolos,12 the 
Senate Report indicates that whistleblower tips detected over fifty 
percent of fraud schemes uncovered in public companies.13 
There are a number of requirements that must be satisfied before a 
whistleblower will recover an award.14  First, the whistleblower must 
submit the information voluntarily.15  The whistleblower must also 
provide “original” information, meaning “derived from the independent 
knowledge or analysis of a whistleblower,” and “not known to the 
Commission from any other source.”16  This information must result in a 
successful SEC enforcement action with money paid in an amount over 
the one million statutory minimum.17  While “related actions” such as 
those brought by the DOJ may satisfy the statutory requirements, an 
SEC action must share a common nucleus of operative fact to the 
 
 9. See id. § 78u-6(b)(1). 
 10. Id. § 78u-6(A)(1).  (“[C]overed judicial or administrative action means any judicial or 
administrative action brought by the Commission under the securities laws . . . .”).  Commentators have 
opined that the FCPA will be one of the security laws most affected by Dodd–Frank.  See, e.g., 
Ebersole, supra note 3, at 132 (“[M]any tips incentivized by Dodd–Frank are expected to report Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act . . . violations.”).  In 2011, FCPA tips represented only 3.9% of the overall tips 
brought to the SEC’s whistleblower office.  See U.S. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION ANNUAL 
REPORT ON THE DODD–FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM, FISCAL YEAR 2011, at app. A (2011), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/whistleblower-annual-report-2011.pdf. 
 11. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 110 (2010). 
 12. Mr. Markopolos is a financial analyst, independent fraud investigator, and certified fraud 
examiner who repeatedly provided the SEC with information on a Ponzi scheme run by Bernard 
Madoff, for an eight-and-a-half year period between May 2000 and December 2006, only to have the 
organization ignore his tips, allowing the fraud to reach $50 Billion before finally being caught.  See 
Assessing the Madoff Ponzi Scheme and Regulatory Failures, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital 
Mkts., Ins., & Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 4-5 (2009) (statements 
of Mr. Markopolos). 
 13. See S. REP NO. 111-176, at 110. 
 14. “Whistleblower,” as used in Dodd–Frank, “means any individual who provides, or 2 or more 
individuals acting jointly who provide, information relating to a violation of a securities laws to the 
Commission, in a manner established, by rule or regulation, by the Commission.”  15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-
6(a)(6) (West 2010). 
 15. SEC Rules, Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4 
(2011). 
 16. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(a)(3) (West 2010). 
 17. Id. § 78u-6(b)(1). 
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“related action,” or no reward will be given.18   
Several individuals are excluded from receiving an award, such as 
employees of the DOJ or SEC and their family members, and foreigner 
government officials, including employees of state-owned enterprises.19  
In addition to the provision incentivizing reporting, Dodd–Frank 
includes an anti-retaliation provision giving whistleblowers a cause of 
action and immediate jurisdiction in federal court if an employer takes 
retaliatory action against a whistleblower.20 
Whistleblowers do not have to report the violations internally to their 
company before reporting to the SEC.21  This was a widely debated 
issue leading up to the promulgation of the rules by the SEC.  Some 
argue that by not requiring internally reporting first, whistleblowers will 
circumvent internal compliance programs.22  Others believe that 
requiring internal reporting first would effectively eliminate the 
program, as whistleblowers would face increased hurdles and would 
likely not report at all.23  Following the SEC’s release of its final rules 
that did not include the “report first” requirement, an amendment was 
proposed in Congress, deemed the “Whistleblower Improvement Act.”24  
If it had been enacted, it would have required whistleblowers to report 
internally first.25  It is likely that the debate surrounding the reporting 
first requirement will continue. 
B. Qui Tam Provisions 
Qui tam is the commonly used abbreviated form of the Latin phrase 
“qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur,” 
which translates into “who as well for the king as for himself sues in this 
 
 18. Id. § 78u-6(a)(5) (“‘[R]elated action’ . . . means any judicial or administrative 
action . . . based upon the original information provided by a whistleblower . . . that led to the successful 
enforcement of the Commission action.”) (emphasis added).  To determine whether two or more 
proceedings involve the same common nucleus of operative facts, courts look at “factors such as 
‘whether the facts are related in time, space, origin or motivation,’ ‘whether they form a convenient trial 
unit,’ and whether treating them as a unit ‘conforms to the parties’ expectations.”’  In re Iannochino, 
242 F.3d 36, 46 (1st Cir. 2001) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1982)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 19. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(c)(2) (West 2010). 
 20. See id. § 78u-6(h). 
 21. Implementation of the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 34-64545, 2011 WL 2293084 (May 25, 2011) [hereinafter SEC 
Final Rule Release] (“[W]e have determined not to include a requirement that whistleblowers report 
violations internally.”). 
 22. See id. at 34324.  Mr. Oxley’s quote at the beginning of this Comment also captures this 
point of view.  See E-mail from Mr. Michael Oxley, supra note 4. 
 23. See E-Mail from Mr. Michael Oxley, supra note 4. 
 24. H.R. 2483, 112th Cong. 1st Sess. (2011). 
 25. Id. 
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matter.”26  A qui tam provision allows an individual plaintiff, known as 
a relator, to sue for themself and on behalf of the government.27 
Such actions have an extensive history within the laws of England 
and the United States, and qui tam actions are believed to have 
originated around the end of the thirteenth century.28  The American 
experience with qui tam provisions began soon after the first settlers 
arrived in the country.29  Colonial legislatures enacted qui tam statutes, 
and such actions were brought forth both before and after the signing of 
the Constitution.30 
The rationale behind a qui tam provision was that the “common 
informer” was needed for self-regulation, as the king and colonial 
governments lacked the resources to enforce their laws effectively.31  
Individual citizens were better positioned and were an inexpensive 
supplement to the government’s limited resources.  However, qui tam 
actions were not without their critics.  Critics have long expressed the 
countervailing concern that overzealous citizens enforcing the law 
would bring meritless claims.32 
While qui tam provisions have been included in several statutes,33 the 
provisions are most associated with the False Claims Act (FCA),34 
where they have been employed with undeniable success.35  The FCA is 
 
 26. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).  
 27. See Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 769 (2000). 
 28. Id. at 774; see also JAMES B. HELMER, JR., FALSE CLAIMS ACT: WHISTLEBLOWER 
LITIGATION § 2-1 (5th ed. 2007) (stating most commentators trace the first qui tam provision to around 
14th century).  But see CHARLES DOYLE, QUI TAM: THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND RELATED FEDERAL 
STATUTES, 2 (Cong. Research Serv. 2000), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40785.pdf 
(finding “[t]he earliest cited example of a qui tam provision is the 695 declaration of King Withred of 
Kent . . . ”). 
 29. Vermont Agency, 529 U.S. at 776.  
 30. See id.  Solidified in our jurisprudence, the landmark constitutional law case of McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) was a qui tam action.  See also HELMER, supra note 28, § 2-1. 
 31. See HELMER, supra note 28, §§ 2-1, 2-2 (“William Holdsworth, a leading English historian, 
[said] the reason for the development of qui tam provisions was that England had no organized police 
force or system of inspectors, so the Government needed to enlist ‘the injured man’ in the cause of law 
and order by offering a large bounty . . . .”) (citing 4 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (3d 
ed. 1923). 
 32. James Y. Ho, Note, State Sovereign Immunity and the False Claims Act: Respecting the 
Limitations Created by the Eleventh Amendment Upon the Federal Courts, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 189, 
194 (1999) (stating that “overzealous pursuit of bounty by qui tam relators” was a factor that caused qui 
tam provision to fall to disuse in England).  There has also been questions regarding the 
Constitutionality of qui tam provisions, but the overwhelming majority of courts have concluded that the 
action is constitutional.  See generally HELMER, supra note 28, §§ 4-1 to 4-8. 
 33. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 201 (2006) (providing cause of action and share of recovery against a 
person violating Indian protection laws). 
 34. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-33 (2006). 
 35. See Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 53 (2002) (stating that qui tam 
provisions in the FCA has been “extraordinarily successful as a regulatory tool” and discussing the 
reasons why). 
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the government’s “primary . . . tool for combating fraud.”36  Since 
significant amendments to the FCA in 1986,37 qui tam actions under the 
FCA have recovered over $40 billion dollars for taxpayers, including 
over $4 billion in 2011 alone.38 
While Dodd–Frank’s whistleblower provision shares commonalities 
with qui tam actions, the differences are significant.  Though both 
actions provide a “bounty” for informants, whistleblowers are at the 
complete mercy of the enforcement agencies to pursue their claim.  Qui 
tam relators, on the other hand, may bring their suit alone if the 
government does not wish to intervene.39  More importantly, Dodd–
Frank’s whistleblower provision suffers from shortcomings, to be 
discussed in Part III, that do not afflict qui tam actions.40 
C. The FCPA 
President Jimmy Carter signed the FCPA into law on December 20, 
1977, signaling to businesses that the United States was taking its first 
steps to curb foreign bribery.41  In passing the law, Congress carefully 
scrutinized the “ethically repugnant and competitively unnecessary” acts 
of bribery that American companies had been conducting abroad.42  
Congress found that more than 400 companies had made questionable or 
illegal payments totaling well over $300 million to foreign government 
officials, politicians, and political parties in the years prior to enactment 
of the bill.43  The consensus among Congress was that “foreign bribery 
is a reprehensible activity” and “action must be taken to proscribe it.”44 
Substantively, the FCPA prohibits corruptly offering or giving 
anything of value to a foreign official for the purpose of obtaining or 
retaining business, or otherwise influencing that official’s decision-
making ability.45  The statute also contains a “books and record” 
provision requiring companies to maintain specific recordkeeping 
 
 36. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 2 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5266. 
 37. For a discussion of the significance of the 1986 amendments and the resulting changes to the 
law, see generally HELMER, supra note 28, § 2-6(b). 
 38. See Qui Tam Statistics, TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD, http://www.taf.org/statistics.htm (last 
visited Feb. 18, 2012) [hereinafter Qui Tam Statistics]. 
 39. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4)(B) (2006). 
 40. Compare Part III, with infra Part IV.A. 
 41. See Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907, 912 (2010). 
 42. Id. at 913 (“[President Carter] share[d] Congress’ belief that bribery is ethically repugnant 
and competitively unnecessary.”). 
 43. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4 (1977) (“These corporations have included some of the 
largest and most widely held public companies in the United States; over 117 of them rank in the top 
Fortune 500 industries.”). 
 44. Id. at 6. 
 45. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a), 78dd-3(a) (2006). 
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standards and internal accounting controls.46 
The FCPA has no private cause of action.47  The statute’s 
enforcement is shared between the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the 
SEC.48  The SEC enforces the civil aspects of the statute and has 
jurisdiction over “issuers,” defined as public companies that are required 
to make filings with the SEC.49  The DOJ enforces the criminal aspects 
of the statute and has jurisdiction over “domestic concerns,” which 
includes individuals and both public and private companies.50 
Despite the statute’s passage in the late seventies, it lay dormant and 
arguably underutilized for much of its existence.51  Typically, the 
enforcement agencies brought only two to three enforcement actions 
between 1977 and 2002.52  However, the number of enforcement actions 
grew precipitously in the new millennium.53  Enforcement numbers have 
set records year after year, with 2010 registering seventy-four 
enforcement actions totaling $1.8 billion in aggregate penalties, 
including eight of the top ten penalties since the statute’s inception.54  
 
 46. See id. § 78m. 
 47. There is no expressed provision granting private parties a cause of action under the FCPA, 
and courts have refused to imply one.  See Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024 (6th Cir. 1990). 
 48. The legislative history indicates Congressional intent for shared jurisdiction between the 
DOJ and SEC.  See S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 11–12 (1977). 
 49. See LUCINDA A. LOW ET AL., ENFORCEMENT OF THE FCPA IN THE UNITED STATES: TRENDS 
AND THE EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS, 1665 PLI/CORP 711, 722–23 (2008) (“‘[I]ssuers’ 
constitutes a narrower universe defined as companies that register securities in accordance with 15 
U.S.C. § 781 or are required to file reports under 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d), or any officer, director, employee 
or agent of such company.”). 
 50. See id. at 722 (“‘[D]omestic concern’ covers a large universe of persons and entities, 
including individual U.S. citizens (wherever located), U.S. resident aliens, corporations and other 
business entities (including partnerships) organized under the laws of a state of the United States or 
having their principal place of business in the United States, and officers, directors, employees and 
agents of any of these entities, regardless of their nationality.”) (footnote omitted).  The DOJ may also 
bring civil actions, where appropriate.  PAUL V. GERLACH & GEORGE B. PARIZEK, THE SEC’S 
ENFORCEMENT OF THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT, in 3 FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 
REPORTER § 14:3 (West, 2d ed. 2008). 
 51. See Koehler, supra note 41, at 913 (“As routinely described, FCPA enforcement was largely 
(yet not entirely) non-existent from 1977 until circa 2002.”); see also Michael B. Bixby, The Lion 
Awakens: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act—1977 to 2010, 12 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 89, 103 (2010) 
(“During the first quarter century of the FCPA’s history, enforcement of the law appears to have been 
minimal, at best.  Clearly, the FCPA was underutilized in achieving the purposes for which the law was 
created.”). 
 52. See Koehler, supra note 41, at 913. 
 53. See Amy Deen Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal Legislation: The Unruly 
Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45 GA. L. REV. 489, 522–23 (2011); see also Bixby, 
supra note 51, at 104–06 (discussing enforcement actions from 2003 to 2010). 
 54. See Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney General, Speech at 24th National Conference on the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 16, 2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2010/crm-speech-101116.html.  For 2010 enforcement 
figures, see FCPA Year in Review 2010, STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP (Mar. 15, 2011), 
http://www.steptoe.com/publications-newsletter-129.html; see also Recent Trends and Patterns in 
8
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While the number of enforcement actions for 2011 (forty-eight) was 
down compared to the previous year, it was still the second highest year 
within the statute’s history.55  In 2012, enforcement actions dropped to 
twenty-three. 
What is unclear and is often lost in the discussion of enforcement 
statistics is whether the number of enforcement actions accurately 
reflects the underlying instances of foreign bribery.56  Has bribing of 
foreign officials actually increased since enactment of the FCPA, or has 
the agenda of the enforcement agencies merely changed?  While 
questions such as these remain, it is likely the case that bribery, like 
other crimes, will never be completely eradicated.57  As such, it is also 
likely that enforcement of the FCPA will always be a priority. 
FCPA cases are rarely litigated as the vast majority of FCPA 
allegations are resolved through deferred or non-prosecutorial 
agreements, pleas, settled civil complaints, cooperation agreements, or 
consent decrees.58  Despite companies resolving alleged violations 
through these avenues, commentators frequently argue that the FCPA 
fails to provide sufficient guidance regarding its punishable offenses.59  
Since inception, the FCPA has been criticized for being ambiguous.60  
Even after two amendments to the statute, these criticisms remain.61 
 
FCPA Enforcement, SHEARMAN AND STERLING LLP (Jan. 20, 2011), 
http://www.shearman.com/files/upload/FCPA-Trends-and-Patterns-Jan-2011.pdf. 
 55. See 2011 Year-End FCPA Update, GIBSON DUNN (Jan. 3, 2012) 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2011YearEndFCPAUpdate.pdf. 
 56. See generally Phillip Segal, Coming Clean on Dirty Dealing: Time for a Fact-Based 
Evaluation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 18 FLA. J. INT’L L. 169 (2006) (arguing that the FCPA 
has been greatly under-enforced since enactment and elaborating on the problems inherent with 
estimating enforcement efficiency).  It would be interesting to see if Segal felt, given the increase in 
FCPA enforcement actions following the writing of his article, that present enforcement levels were 
adequate. 
 57. See id. at 174 (“The realistic goal cannot be to eradicate foreign bribe-giving, any more than 
legislatures that prohibit murder believe they will completely do away with homicide.”); accord Ethan 
S. Burger & Mary S. Holland, Why the Private Sector Is Likely to Lead the Next Stage in the Global 
Fight Against Corruption, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 45, 50 (2006) (“Corruption will never be entirely 
eradicated . . . .”). 
 58. See Koehler, supra note 41, at 929. 
 59. See, e.g., Jennifer Dawn Taylor, Comment, Ambiguities in the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act: Unnecessary Costs of Fighting Corruption?, 61 LA. L. REV. 861 (2001) (“[T]he legislation 
ambiguously defines prohibited conduct and its provisions lack an adequate standard by which to 
determine the nature of contemplated activity.”). 
 60. See, e.g., Note, The Accounting Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: An 
Alternative Perspective on SEC Intervention in Corporate Governance, 89 YALE L. J. 1573, 1575 
(1980) (“The accounting provisions of the FCPA were framed in ambiguous, far-ranging terms . . . .”); 
Laura E. Longobardi, Reviewing the Situation: What Is to Be Done with the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act?, 20 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 431, 446 (1987) (“These ambiguities are perhaps the clearest 
evidence that the FCPA is a very poorly drafted piece of legislation.”). 
 61. See William Alan Nelson II, Attorney Liability Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: 
Legal and Ethical Challenges and Solutions, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 255, 299 (2009) (“The FCPA has 
9
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Legislators recently held hearings regarding the FCPA, indicating a 
possible willingness to amend the statute once again.62  While a 
previously proposed amendment would have created a limited private 
right of action,63 no proposals currently include adding a qui tam 
provision.64 
III. SHORTCOMINGS OF DODD–FRANK’S WHISTLEBLOWER PROVISION AS 
APPLIED TO THE FCPA 
Collectively, the shortcomings of Dodd–Frank’s whistleblower 
provision can be divided into two categories.  The first category includes 
statutory impediments, meaning that either the statute or the SEC 
regulations of the whistleblower program result in actions that hinder the 
FCPA and its goals.  The second category includes general 
administrative concerns that will materialize once the statute is given 
effect.  These two categories are discussed in turn. 
A. Statutory Impediments 
1. SEC Must Have an Enforcement Action 
Dodd–Frank requires the SEC to complete a successful enforcement 
action prior to any payout being awarded to a whistleblower.65  While 
this makes sense in the vast majority of securities violations—as these 
 
many ambiguities in both its scope and application.”); see also United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 743–
44 (5th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he district court concluded that the FCPA’s language is ambiguous . . . .  We 
agree with the court’s finding of ambiguity . . . .”). 
 62. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011); Examining Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs of the Comm. of the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010). 
 63. See H.R. Res. 2152, 111th Cong., 1st Sess. (2009). 
 64. There has never been a proposal by Congress to include a qui tam provision within the 
FCPA.  Professor Paul D. Carrington has advocated for such a provision within the FCPA, but for use 
by foreign nationals.  See Paul D. Carrington, Law and Transnational Corruption: The Need for 
Lincoln’s Law Abroad, 70 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109 (2007) [hereinafter Law and Transnational 
Corruption]; Paul D. Carrington, Enforcing International Corrupt Practices Law, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 
129 (2010).  Other authors have either asserted more broadly that the FCPA should be amended to 
include a private cause of action, or have argued that there are greater opportunities for the private sector 
to join in the fight against corruption.  See, e.g., Burger & Holland, supra note 57; Bucy, supra note 35; 
Daniel Pines, Comment, Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to Include a Private Right of 
Action, 82 CAL. L. REV. 185 (1994) (private cause of action for competing businesses); Aaron R. Petty, 
Note, How Qui Tam Actions Could Fight Public Corruption, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 851 (2006).  
While the author of this Comment concurs with much of the reasoning underpinning these proposals and 
the conclusion that the private sector needs to be better utilized in the fight against corruption, this 
Comment argues that the best solution is a qui tam provision within the FCPA that all persons can 
utilize. 
 65. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(a)(1) (West 2010); 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-3 (2011). 
10
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violations would be subject to SEC jurisdiction—the FCPA’s dual 
enforcement structure means that there will be violations of the FCPA 
that will never be eligible for a whistleblower award.  In many FCPA 
enforcement actions, either the SEC lacks jurisdiction or the DOJ alone 
conducts the action.66  As the SEC’s jurisdiction is limited to issuers, the 
SEC does not have jurisdiction over most privately held companies, and 
individuals.67  Individuals have become increasingly targeted for 
violating the FCPA,68 yet the requirement of an SEC action hinders this 
goal, as tips involving individuals will not be incentivized. 
The fact that DOJ actions will satisfy as a “related action” under the 
statute does not remedy the problem.  In order for there to be a 
whistleblower award, the DOJ action must share a common nucleus of 
operative fact with an SEC action.69  But if the DOJ alone has 
jurisdiction, the SEC can never bring the necessary related action.  
Therefore, no whistleblower will ever be able to recover a reward for 
reporting bribery by companies not subject to SEC jurisdiction, and no 
one will likely submit tips. 
In short, Dodd–Frank provides no incentives for whistleblowers to 
come forward and report violations where the SEC has no jurisdiction—
leaving out tips involving individuals and privately-held companies.  
The requirement of an SEC action before recovery as applied to the 
FCPA is poor policy and fails to incentivize tips from otherwise unlikely 
to be discovered instances of foreign bribery. 
 
 66. See, e.g., United States v. AGA Med. Corp., No. 0:08-cr-00172-1 (D. Minn. June 3, 2008); 
United States v. BAE Systems, No. 1:10-cr-00035 (D.D.C. Feb. 4, 2010); United States v. Basu, No. 02-
cr-475 (D.D.C. Nov. 26, 2002); United States v. Sengupta, No. 02-cr-40 (D.D.C. Jan. 30, 2002); United 
States v. Kozeny, No. 05-cr-518 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2005); United States v. Bridgestone Co., No. 4:11-
cr-00651 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 15, 2011); United States v. Carson, No. 09-cr-077 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2009); 
United States v. Control Sys. Specialist, Inc., No. CR-3-98-073 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 19, 1998); United 
States v. Eagle Bus. Mfg. Inc., No. B-91-171 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 2, 1991); United States v. F.G. Mason 
Eng’g Inc., No. 90-0029 (D. Conn. June 1, 1990); United States v. Giffen, No. 03-cr-663 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 28, 2003); United States v. Giffen, No. 03-cr-404 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2003); United States v. Green, 
No. 2:08-cr-00059 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2009); United States v. ABB Inc., No. 4:10-cr-00664 (S.D. Tex. 
Sept. 29, 2010); United States v. ABB Vetco Gray, Inc., No. CR H-04-279 (S.D. Tex. June 22, 2004); 
United States v. Latin Node, Inc., No. 09-20239 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 23, 2009); United States v. Godsey, No. 
09-cr-349 (D.D.C. Dec. 1, 2009); United States v. Nguyen, No. 2:08-cr-00522 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 2009); 
United States v. Saybolt N. Am. Inc., No. 98-CR010266-WGY, (D. Mass. Aug. 18, 1998). 
 67. See LUCINDA A. LOW ET AL., supra note 49, at 722–23. 
 68. ROBERT W. TARUN, ET AL., INTRODUCTORY ESSAY: A PROPOSAL FOR A UNITED STATES 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT LENIENCY POLICY, 1891 PLI/CORP 115, 
124 n.20 (2010) (“[T]he DOJ has increasingly focused on prosecuting individuals engaged in FCPA 
misconduct, particularly in light of the perceived substantial deterrent effect of such prosecutions.”). 
 69. SEC Final Rule Release, supra note 21, at 34305 (“We have not modified the rule to permit a 
whistleblower to recover in a related action absent a successful Commission action, because the statute 
expressly requires a successful Commission action before there can be a ‘related action’ upon which a 
whistleblower may recover.”) (footnote omitted). 
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2. One Million Dollar Statutory Minimum 
Dodd–Frank’s one million dollar statutory minimum70 is another 
example of the statute’s whistleblower provision falling short as applied 
to the FCPA, as Dodd–Frank fails to incentivize whistleblower tips for 
all acts of bribery.  The reason for including this minimum amount of 
recovery is not explicitly stated in the legislative history.  One plausible 
reason is that the whistleblower provision was designed to catch the 
worst of the worst offenders of securities violations.   
Dodd–Frank was passed to eliminate “too big to fail firms” indicating 
Congressional intent on monitoring the largest entities in the regulatory 
scheme.71  Perhaps Congress felt the whistleblower provision should 
also focus on the largest offenders.  If this justification is accepted, then 
the threshold amount is evidence that the government has limited 
resources and, at some point, must arbitrarily filter tips to focus 
prosecutorial resources on violations it deems worthy of pursuing. 
The issue with this threshold is that the FCPA was meant to prohibit 
all bribery, irrespective of the amount given or the degree of damage.  
The FCPA has broad provisions prohibiting giving “anything of 
value,”72 and it includes no statutory minimum or de minimis 
exception.73  While FCPA violations have recently hit record amounts, 
including Siemen AG’s $1.6 billion penalty,74 these violations 
overshadow numerous other actions that recover less, but are still 
important.  Enforcement actions that are resolved for amounts less than 
Dodd–Frank’s statutory minimum still yield significant penalties.75 
 
 70. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(b)(1) (West 2010). 
 71. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376, at 1 (201) (“To promote the financial stability of the United States by improving 
accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail,’ to protect the American 
taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for 
other purposes.”). 
 72. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a), 78dd-3(a) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 73. Marie M. Dalton, Note, Efficiency v. Morality: The Codification of Cultural Norms in the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 583, 598 (2006) (“There is no minimum 
pecuniary value required to implicate the bribery prohibitions and no de minimis exception exists to 
prevent the Act’s application.”). 
 74. SEC v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, No. 08-CV-02167 (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008). 
 75. See, e.g., United States v. Hioki, No. 08-795 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 2008) ($80,000); United 
States v. Pitchford, No. 02-CR-00365 (D.D.C. Sept. 3, 2002) ($400,000); United States v. Goodyear 
Int’l Corp., No. 89-0156 (D.D.C. May 11, 1989) ($250,000); In re Omega Advisors, Inc. (July 6, 2007) 
($500,000); United States v. Self, No. 8:08-cr-110-AG-1 (C.D. Ca. Nov. 17, 2008) ($40,000); United 
States v. Young & Rubicam, Inc., 741 F. Supp. 334 (D. Conn. 1990) ($500,000); United States v. 
Westinghouse Air Brake Tech. Corp., No. 08-cv-706 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 14, 2008) ($300,000); United States 
v. Kay, 200 F. Supp. 2d 681 (S.D. Tex. 2004) ($1,300); SEC v. Murphy, No. H-02-2908 (S.D. Tex. 
Aug. 1, 2002) ($11,298); SEC v. Ashland Oil, Inc., No. 86-CV-1904 (D.D.C. July 8, 1986) (injunction 
only); SEC v. Avery Dennison Corp., No. 2:09-cv-5493 (C.D. Cal. July 28, 2009) ($518,470); In re Ball 
Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 34-64123 (Mar. 24, 2011) ($300,000); SEC v. BellSouth Corp., No. 
12
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As a society, it would seem that we should care about combating 
corruption, no matter the penalty charged or amount recovered.  
Corruption is corruption; a person who makes a $5 bribe is just as 
culpable as a person who makes a $5 million bribe.  Yet, Dodd–Frank’s 
whistleblower provision provides no incentive to informants with small-
bribe information. 
If one adheres to the view that bribery breeds more bribery,76 then by 
failing to target all bribery, systemic problems will be left unreported by 
whistleblowers.  Congress sought to avoid the problematic situation in 
which detection of financial crimes was left solely to the enforcement 
agencies by passing Dodd–Frank’s whistleblower provision in the first 
place, yet for small-time bribes that is exactly what will occur. 
The rational whistleblower questioning whether to report incidents of 
small-time bribery faces a dilemma.77  The whistleblower may forego 
coming forward with information relating to the bribery, given the 
uncertainty of achieving the statutory amount required for an award.  A 
whistleblower must have great courage and resolve as they often have to 
risk their entire career in exposing a crime.78  Would a whistleblower 
want to risk so much and fall short of any compensation?  In weighing 
the risks of whistleblowing against the questionable result of an award, 
refusing to come forward with information may be a rational decision 
for that potential whistleblower. 
One could argue that the million dollar threshold, even if failing to 
incentivize tips for smaller instances of bribery, will not be all that 
limiting given that targeting the largest of bribes produces a deterrent 
effect to all bribers.79  It is likely that individuals engaged in smaller 
 
02-0113 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 15, 2002) ($150,000); SEC v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 1:01-cv-02079 
(D.D.C. Oct. 3, 2001) ($100,000); SEC v. Con-way, Inc., No. 08-1478 (D.D.C. Aug. 27, 2008) 
($300,000); SEC v. Delta & Pine Land Co., No. 1:07-cv-01352 (D.D.C. July 26, 2007) ($300,000); SEC 
v. Int. Bus. Mach. Co., 00-Civ-3040 (D.D.C. Dec. 21, 2000) ($300,000); SEC v. Montedison, S.P.A., 
No. 1:96-CV-02631, (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 1996) ($300,000); SEC v. Nature’s Sunshine Prods. Inc., No. 09-
0672 (D. Utah July 31, 2009) ($650,000); SEC v. Triton Energy Co., No. 97-CV-00401 (D.D.C. Feb. 
27, 1997) ($385,000); SEC v. Veraz Networks, Inc., No. 5:10-cv-2849 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 2010) 
($300,000). 
 76. SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND 
REFORM 126 (2009) (“Frequently, in a competitive environment, bribery breeds more bribery, until the 
system is permeated with corruption.”). 
 77. An example is illustrative.  Imagine that whistleblower A has information that company B is 
bribing foreign organization C with $75,000 cash.  It is not clear that this bribe would result in a 
recovery that satisfies the $1,000,000 threshold.  Whistleblower A would likely question whether to 
report.  See SEC v. Schering-Plough Corp., No. 04-0945, (D.D.C. June 9, 2004) (similar facts and only a 
$500,000 penalty imposed). 
 78. See S. REP. NO. 111-176 at 111 (2010) (“Recognizing that whistleblowers often face the 
difficult choice between telling the truth and the risk of committing ‘career suicide . . . .’”); see also 
HELMER, supra note 28, § 1-2 (“In all cases, the whistleblower risks (and is usually successful in) losing 
his job, career, family, and friends.”). 
 79. I owe my thanks to Claire Sylvia for this point.  I also owe my thanks to Ben Dusing for the 
13
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instances of bribes will reconsider their actions when record-setting 
enforcement penalties are assessed to other perpetrators.  Further, it 
would be impossible for any enforcement agency, even with the 
assistance of private citizens, to target all instances of bribery. 
Nevertheless, the one million dollar threshold is an arbitrary 
requirement.  While the threshold may be representative of Dodd–
Frank’s focus on the worst offenders, it conflicts with Congressional 
intent, as shown in the FCPA, to prohibit all instances of foreign 
bribery.  Dodd–Frank’s million dollar threshold, as applied to the FCPA, 
is an unnecessary statutory impediment. 
3. Exclusion of Foreign Government Employees 
FCPA violations, by virtue of involving foreigners, almost necessarily 
have to occur off American soil.  It follows that a major source of 
knowledge relating to bribes are foreigners.  However, under Dodd–
Frank’s final rules, foreign government employees, including employees 
of state-owned enterprises are unable to receive an award.80  This is a 
shortcoming as applied to the FCPA; employees of state-owned 
enterprises are often better positioned to uncover bribes, and excluding 
these individuals from recovery runs contrary to the trend of increasing 
transnational anti-bribery efforts.81 
The SEC, in finalizing the rules for Dodd–Frank, contemplated and 
decided against one commentator’s proposal that the foreign 
government employee exemption not be included.82  In justifying its 
decision to include the exemption, the SEC cited concerns of interfering 
with foreign sovereignty, potentially undermining treaties, and 
incentivizing foreigners not to report locally, as well as questions about 
how to protect foreign whistleblowers.83 
 
following additional points:  one could also quarrel with whether the statutory threshold is all that 
limiting given the current enforcement trends of the FCPA.  The current norm is large payouts, as shown 
in 2010.  Furthermore, one could argue whether whistleblowers have to risk their careers under Dodd–
Frank, given that they are able to report anonymously and would become publicly known only after they 
receive their award, in which case they likely no longer care about being known to the company.  These 
are legitimate points, but there are, in fact plenty of FCPA violations being resolved for under the 
statutory amount that do not get highly publicized.  See cases cited supra note 75.  As to whistleblowers 
reporting anonymously and risking very little, this is not so much a problem related to the statutory 
amount as much as a problem of Dodd–Frank generally.  See infra Part III.B.3.  This latter problem 
could be fixed by the FCPA adopting a qui tam provision.  See infra Part IV.F. 
 80. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-8(c)(2) (2011). 
 81. See Letter from National Whistleblower Center to Securities and Exchange Commission 
(Feb. 10, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-159.pdf. 
 82. SEC Final Rule Release, supra note 21, at 34334 (“We have decided to maintain the 
exclusion for ‘foreign officials’ as proposed.”). 
 83. Id. at 34335 (“[Potential repercussions include] the perception that the United States is 
interfering with foreign sovereignty, potentially undermining foreign government cooperation under 
14
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Even assuming the SEC reached the proper decision, the exclusion is 
still a statutory impediment.  The SEC’s commentary did not seem to 
doubt this; its justifications were relating only to notions of foreign 
comity. 
B. Administrative Concerns 
1. Too Much Reliance on the SEC 
Dodd–Frank requires the whistleblower to rely entirely on the SEC, 
but the problem with this structure is that the SEC has a poor track 
record with whistleblower programs.  This is not the SEC’s first venture 
into a whistleblower program.  Previously, the SEC operated a 
whistleblower program that was ineffective to the point of nonexistence.  
During its twenty-two year lifetime, the prior program paid out a 
“meager total of $159,537” to five whistleblowers.84 
The SEC’s biggest whistleblower black eye was shown by its 
handling of Harry Markopolos, who on numerous occasions tried to 
bring the Bernard Madoff Ponzi scheme85 to the SEC’s attention, only to 
be turned away.86  Despite numerous tips over an eight-and-a-half year 
period, the SEC failed to detect and end the crime.87 
Dodd–Frank’s whistleblower program differs from the old SEC 
program in several respects.  The SEC has adopted some of the offered 
recommendations to strengthen its whistleblower program under Dodd–
Frank.88  Changes have included a new whistleblower office,89 and a 
 
existing treaties (including multilateral and bilateral mutual legal assistance treaties), the incentive for 
foreign officials to make reports to the United States rather than to local authorities, and concerns about 
protection of foreign officials who become whistleblowers.”). 
 84. S. REP. 111-176, at 111 (2010) (citing Assessment of the SEC’s Bounty Program, Office of 
Inspector General, U.S. Sec. & Exchange Comm’n, Report No. 474, Mar. 29, 2010). 
 85. Bernard Madoff was the perpetrator of an “infamous Ponzi scheme” that existed for decades 
through his company Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC.  During the course of the fraud, 
there were approximately 90,000 disbursements of fictitious profits to Madoff investors totaling $18.5 
billion. Mr. Madoff pled guilty and was sentenced to 150 years in prison.  For more information on the 
fraud, see In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec., LLC, 440 B.R. 243, 249–53 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010), leave 
to appeal denied, 2011 WL 3897970 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 86. See Assessing the Madoff Ponzi Scheme and Regulatory Failures, Hearing before the 
Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government sponsored Enterprises of the Comm. on 
Financial Services, 111th Cong. 4-5 (2009) (statements of Mr. Markopolos). 
 87. Id. 
 88. The Office of Inspector General had recommended that the program develop specific criteria 
for recommending award of bounties and incorporating best practices from the DOJ and IRS, among 
others.  See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, ASSESSMENT OF THE SEC’S BOUNTY PROGRAM, at iv–v 
(Mar. 29, 2010) [hereinafter ASSESSMENT OF THE SEC’S BOUNTY PROGRAM], available at 
http://www.sec-oig.gov/Reports/AuditsInspections/2010/474.pdf. 
 89. Office of the Whistleblower, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/whistleblower (last visited Feb. 18, 
15
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minimum guaranteed award to successful whistleblowers.90  However, 
the office employs only a small staff for what it estimates to be around 
30,000 tips each year.91 
Even assuming the new whistleblower office can correct the prior 
failings of the SEC, and notwithstanding the SEC’s “increased 
anticorruption commitment . . . and more robust compliance oversight,” 
the fact remains that the SEC is “a very small navy to patrol a very large 
ocean.”92  The SEC has a well-documented history of being under-
resourced.93  Importantly, Dodd–Frank applies to all securities violations 
and not just to violations of the FCPA.94  The scope of violations 
reported will likely be expansive.  Whether FCPA tips will be a high 
priority is an open question. 
The problem with relying solely on the SEC to prosecute crimes is 
that, historically, the SEC has shown itself incapable.95  Dodd–Frank 
assists the SEC only with detection of regulatory violations.  Just 
because a violation is detected, does not necessarily mean that the 
violation will be prosecuted.  As a result, Dodd–Frank’s whistleblower 
provision places too much reliance on the SEC. 
2. Whistleblower’s Inability to Bring the Claim 
Dodd–Frank creates unnecessary work for the SEC in managing a 
new whistleblower office and program, in addition to its main duties.  
More SEC bureaucracy is not the answer to enforcing FCPA and serves 
only to weaken whistleblower representation in a manner that hinders 
the uncovering of financial crimes. 
 
2012). 
 90. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(b)(1)(A) (West 2010). 
 91. See SEC Final Rule Release, supra note 21, at 34354. 
 92. Robert W. Tarun & Peter P. Tomczak, A Proposal for a United States Department of Justice 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Leniency Policy, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 153, 203–04 (2010). 
 93. See In re Nat’l Presto Indus., 347 F.3d 662, 664 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Federal agencies have 
limited resources, and the SEC in particular is often outgunned by the affluent defendants that it sues.”); 
In re SmithKline Beckman Corp. Sec. Litig., 751 F. Supp. 525, 535 (1990) (“Private litigation aids 
effective enforcement of the securities laws because private plaintiffs prosecute violations that might 
otherwise go undetected due to the SEC’s limited resources.”).  The SEC itself recognizes that it is 
limited in resources, see SEC Final Rule Release, supra note 21, at 34325 (“[D]ue to our limited 
resources . . . .”). 
 94. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(A)(1) (West 2010) (“[C]overed judicial or administrative action means 
any judicial or administrative action brought by the Commission under the securities laws . . . .”). 
 95. See Jerry W. Markham, The Subprime Crisis-Some Thoughts on a “Sustainable” and 
“Organic” Regulatory System, 4 FIU L. REV. 381, 406 (2009) (“The SEC was incapable of detecting or 
preventing the Enron era scandals, the subprime crisis or even Bernard Madoff’s monstrous $50 billion 
Ponzi scheme.”); Michael J. Borden, The Role of Financial Journalists in Corporate Governance, 12 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 311, 365 (2007) (“The SEC is incapable of effectively monitoring all 
corporate activity for fraud.”). 
16
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Rather than letting the whistleblower become part of the solution in 
managing the SEC’s workload,96 Dodd–Frank’s whistleblower program 
minimizes the role of the whistleblower to its most basic level—an 
informant.  Whistleblowers are not a part of the litigation, but are merely 
a piece of the evidence if their tip goes that far.  The whistleblower does 
not have a stake in the matter beyond the potential award that may arise 
from a successful SEC action.  The whistleblower is reliant on the 
resources and determination of the SEC to bring a claim, litigate, and 
vociferously battle to vindicate wrongs.  While questions exist over 
whether a whistleblower could intervene in settlements,97  it seems odd 
that the whistleblower does not participate in the litigation as the norm, 
given their interest in the matter. 
As a practicing attorney from one of the most successful 
whistleblower firms in the country has aptly recognized, “The decision 
whether to shut whistleblowers and their attorneys out of SEC 
investigations could be the linchpin of whether this new law will be 
successful . . . .”98  This may be true, but because Dodd–Frank creates a 
paradigm that by its very nature minimizes the role of whistleblowers, 
the failure of the program could be predetermined.  While 
whistleblowers may take steps to assist the SEC, ultimately the critical 
decision—whether to actually bring a claim—is solely within the 
discretion of the SEC. 
For whistleblowers, the inability to bring a claim themselves means 
that their tip or information may be lost when it gets to the SEC, similar 
to what has occurred in the IRS’s whistleblower program.99  
Whistleblowers will find no solace in the fact that the new SEC program 
is based upon the IRS program.100 
The inability to bring a claim may also mean no claim is ever 
brought, or even if a claim is brought the whistleblowers might have to 
fight the government to ensure that they get their fair share.101  In short, 
 
 96. If the FCPA adopted a qui tam provision, the enforcement workload would not overburden 
the SEC, as private citizens could provide the much needed supplemental resources.  See infra Part 
IV.C. 
 97. See Memorandum from Cadwalader, Wickerham & Taft to Clients & Friends, The Dodd-
Frank Whistleblower Provisions: Considerations for Effectively Preparing for and Responding to 
Whistleblowers, n.16, (May 26, 2011), available at 
http://www.cadwalader.com/assets/client_friend/052611DoddFrankWhistleblowerProvisions.pdf. 
 98. Eric R. Havian, The SEC Whistleblower Program: How to Avoid Killing a Good Idea, 
TRUTHOUT.ORG (Dec. 15, 2010), http://www.truth-out.org/solution-dont-let-wall-street-get-away-with-
it-protect-and-reward-sec-whistleblowers65971. 
 99. See MaryClaire Dale, IRS awards $4.5 Million to Whistleblower, USA TODAY (Apr. 8, 2011) 
http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfi/taxes/2011-04-08-irs-whistleblower-taxes-reward.htm (“The 
accountant filed a complaint with the IRS in 2007 . . . but heard nothing for two years.”). 
 100. See S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 111 (2010). 
 101. The government has fought awards to whistleblowers in a number of contexts.  See, e.g., 
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the whistleblower’s inability to bring the claim is a significant 
disincentive to the whistleblower. 
3. Low Risk, High Reward Paradigm 
The final administrative concern of Dodd–Frank is the bitter and 
inequitable paradigm it creates.  Generally, whistleblowers must put 
their careers on the line and take tremendous risk for what they believe 
is right.102  However, these difficulties may have disappeared under 
Dodd–Frank as whistleblowers can submit a tip anonymously and have 
no requirement to report internally first.103   
While this is beneficial for the whistleblower, awards under Dodd–
Frank may not be commensurate with the efforts of the whistleblower.  
Essentially, Dodd–Frank creates a lottery mentality for potential 
whistleblowers.104  Whistleblowers and their attorneys are likely to 
receive “a large sum of money for not actually doing a lot of legal 
work.”105  This paradigm has already created great angst in the business 
community and defense bar, and ultimately could lead to the new 
programs undoing. 
Currently, some businesses are concerned that Dodd–Frank’s 
whistleblower provision will breed over-reporting and the abrogation of 
internal controls.106  This might come to fruition as Congress, in 
enacting Dodd–Frank, created incentives for reporting without requiring 
the whistleblower to have some “skin in the game.”107  Dodd–Frank 
creates an environment where the whistleblower can easily provide a tip 
to the SEC and then sit back, without any further effort, to await a 
potential pay-day;108 the whistleblower only has to fill out a 6-page 
 
HELMER, supra note 28, § 1-4(b) (discussing DOJ marginalizing whistleblower contributions and 
awards in FCA context); Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Whistleblowers and Qui Tam for Tax, 61 TAX L. 357, 
364–67 (2008) (noting hard times of whistleblowers attempting to collect their share of judgments and 
settlements under IRS’s original whistleblower statute). 
 102. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
 103. See SEC Final Rule Release, supra note 21, at 34301 (“[W]e have determined not to include 
a requirement that whistleblowers report violations internally.”). 
 104. See Lucienne M. Hartmann, Comment, Whistle While You Work: The Fairytale-Like 
Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd–Frank Act and the Emergence of “Greedy,” the Eighth Dwarf, 
62 MERCER L. REV. 1279, 1303–13 (2011). 
 105. Id. at 1309. 
 106. See Steven J. Pearlman & Dawn Mertineit, SEC’s Rules Implementing Dodd–Frank’s Bounty 
Provisions Provide Whistleblowers with a Dangerous Weapon, 39 SEC. R. L.J. 141 (2011); see also E-
mail from Mr. Michael Oxley, supra note 4. 
 107. See Ebersole, supra note 3, at 162–63. 
 108. This new paradigm was recognized in the tax whistleblower statute.  See Ventry, supra note 
101 at 383. (“[The] current bounty system may encourage more whistleblowers to come forward than a 
qui tam system, because the procedures of a bounty system are less onerous; whistleblowers can simply 
submit a claim . . . [rather than] hire a lawyer.”). 
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document to submit their tip.109 
This new paradigm may provide greater protection to the 
whistleblower, but it also creates problems for both companies and 
whistleblowers: a whistleblower is subject to minimal risk for a 
(potentially) considerable reward, and a company is subject to maximum 
risk with minimal remedies to discourage an employee from acting out 
of haste or with a lack of information.  Such a paradigm will likely 
increase lobbying against whistleblowers, mar the perception of 
whistleblowers, and could eventually defeat the program. 
Essentially, this “paradigm argument” recognizes the concerns that 
businesses have over the lack of an internal “report first” requirement 
and argues that Dodd–Frank failed to go far enough in creating an 
equitable design that incentivizes reporting while ensuring that the 
business has an opportunity to address the alleged violation.  The end 
result is opposition from the business community and a program that 
will further perpetuate stereotypes and pejorative connotations that have 
stigmatized whistleblowers.110 
IV. THE CASE FOR A QUI TAM PROVISION IN THE FCPA 
If whistleblowers are afforded a proper role—beyond mere 
informant—the government will be able to do more to combat foreign 
bribery than it could acting alone.  While Dodd–Frank purports to utilize 
whistleblowers, it falls short.111  The solution to correct Dodd–Frank’s 
shortcomings and combating foreign bribery is to amend the FCPA to 
include a qui tam provision because: (1) a qui tam provision would not 
suffer from Dodd–Frank’s shortcomings; (2) a qui tam provision is an 
excellent regulatory tool for detecting and prosecuting low-visibility 
crimes; (3) a qui tam provision leverages the strengths of whistleblowers 
better than Dodd–Frank’s whistleblower statute can; (4) a qui tam 
provision could help clarify and establish the parameters of the 
ambiguous FCPA; (5) a qui tam provision represents sound public 
policy in the FCPA; (6) a qui tam provision could be more equitable for 
businesses than Dodd–Frank.  Each of these points is elaborated upon 
below. 
 
 109. Forms are submitted to the SEC on a Form TCR (Tip, Complaint or Referral).  The 6-page 
(plus instructions) document is available at Form TCR, SEC, 
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formtcr.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2012). 
 110. For a sample of stereotypes or negative-connotation names that whistleblowers have been 
called see, for example, Robert T. Rhoad & Matthew T. Fornataro, A Gathering Storm: The New False 
Claims Act Amendments and Their Impact on Healthcare Fraud Enforcement, 21 HEALTH L. 14, 21 
(2009) (greedy bounty hunters); TOM DEVINE ET AL., THE CORPORATE WHISTLEBLOWER’S SURVIVAL 
GUIDE: A HANDBOOK FOR COMMITTING THE TRUTH xi (2011) (rat, tattletale, fink, and turncoat). 
 111. See supra Part III. 
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A. A Qui Tam Provision Would not Suffer from Dodd–Frank’s 
Shortcomings 
Dodd–Frank’s whistleblower provision fails to go far enough as 
applied to the FCPA because statutory and administrative impediments 
hinder its success.112  A qui tam provision, on the other hand, makes 
sense in the FCPA because it would not suffer from these shortcomings 
and would better effectuate Congress’s goal of enhanced regulatory 
enforcement. 
The statutory impediments of Dodd–Frank113 would not be applicable 
to a qui tam provision.  First, qui tam provisions would not need to be 
limited to SEC-only enforcement actions.114  With a qui tam provision, 
the whistleblower would file a claim in camera with the courts and 
notify the applicable enforcement agency.115  There would be no need 
for the “related action” requirement either.  This would be more in line 
with the policy of fighting corruption and would not create disparate 
treatment between public and private companies (and individuals). 
Second, a qui tam provision would not be constrained by the one 
million dollar statutory threshold that currently afflicts Dodd–Frank, as 
no statutory minimum would be necessary.116  While the private sector 
may filter out claims that fail to provide a sufficient return to justify the 
investment by attorneys, the private sector is better suited to fulfill that 
role over a broad statutory filter.  Attorneys would have the option to 
pursue claims out of principle or to invest time in smaller bribery claims 
that might be prosecuted in a shorter amount of time. 
Third, qui tam provisions could also allow foreign government 
employees to bring claims, which is something Dodd–Frank currently 
bars them from doing.117  Given their proximity to the crime, foreigner 
government employees are better situated to have knowledge of bribery.  
Further, the inclusion of foreign government employees would promote 
transnational anti-bribery efforts and strengthen Organization for 
 
 112. See supra Part III. 
 113. See supra Part III.A. 
 114. Compare this with Dodd–Frank, which incentivizes tips for actions only where the SEC has 
jurisdiction.  See supra Part III.A.1. 
 115. This could be modeled after the FCA’s qui tam provision.  See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) 
(2006) (“The complaint shall be filed in camera, shall remain under seal for at least 60 days, and shall 
not be served on the defendant until the court so orders.”). 
 116. See supra Part III.A.2.  This could be modeled after the FCA’s qui tam provision, which 
contains no statutory minimum that claims must exceed before they can be brought.  See 31 U.S.C. 
§§ 3729–3733 (2006). 
 117. See supra Part III.A.3.  This could be modeled after the FCA’s qui tam provision, which 
states, “A person may bring a civil action for a violation of [the statute].”  31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2006) 
(emphasis added).  Person is defined broadly under 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) to include corporations, 
companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals. 
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Economic Development (OECD) commitments.118 
Additionally, the FCPA’s proposed qui tam provision would not 
suffer from the administrative concerns of Dodd–Frank.119  The 
whistleblower would bring the claim with a qui tam action, and the 
government would have the option to join in the action.120  The qui tam 
relator would bring a necessary supplement of private resources to the 
under-resourced and overworked SEC.  The qui tam relator also would 
have no concerns over representation like those of the Dodd–Frank 
whistleblowers.121  Finally, the qui tam enforcement model would be 
more equitable in terms of payouts being commensurate with the 
whistleblower’s efforts.122 
B. A Qui Tam Provision Is an Excellent Regulatory Tool for Detecting 
and Prosecuting Low-Visibility Crimes 
Both fraud and bribery are difficult to detect because they are low-
visibility crimes.123  Despite this inherent difficulty, qui tam provisions 
have proven themselves undeniably successful in uncovering and 
prosecuting fraud, and this success can likely be replicated in the context 
of foreign bribery.124 
The success of qui tam provisions in uncovering fraud can be 
attributed to mechanics of the action that uses a “rogue to catch a 
 
 118. See Letter from National Whistleblower Center to Securities and Exchange Commission, 
supra note 81.  For a discussion of the United States’ OECD commitments, see generally Robert D. 
Tronnes, Note, Ensuring Uniformity in the Implementation of the 1997 OECD Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, 33 GEO. WASH. 
INTL. L. REV. 97 (2000). 
 119. See supra Part III.B (discussing administrative concerns of Dodd–Frank’s whistleblower 
provision). 
 120. The FCPA’s qui tam provision could be similar to the FCA’s.  See 31 U.S.C. § 3130(b)(4) 
(2006) (“[T]he Government shall [either] proceed with the action . . . or notify the court that it declines 
to take over the action, in which case the person bringing the action shall have the right to conduct the 
action.”). 
 121. See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing the lack of whistleblower representation concerns). 
 122. See supra Part III.B.3 (discussing the changing paradigm post Dodd–Frank). 
 123. Compare Hyatt v. Northrop Corp., 883 F. Supp 484, 487 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (“Because of the 
inherent difficulty in detecting fraud . . . .”), with United States v. Myers, 527 F. Supp. 1206, 1229 (E.D. 
N.Y. 1981) (“[B]ribery is difficult to detect”); accord William L. Larson, Note, Effective Enforcement of 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 32 STAN. L. REV. 561, 569 (1980) (“[I]t is difficult to discover 
[FCPA] violations . . . because the violations occur outside the United States and both parties to the 
bribe try to conceal it.”). 
 124. See Pamela H. Bucy, “Carrots and Sticks”: Post-Enron Regulatory Initiatives, 8 BUFF. 
CRIM. L. REV. 277, 322 (2004) (“The number of suits filed and monetary judgments obtained in qui tam 
FCA actions, especially when compared to other existing private attorney general actions, shows that the 
qui tam FCA private justice model is successful.”).  Within fiscal year 2011 alone, over $4 billion was 
recovered through state and federal qui tam suits.  See Qui Tam Statistics, supra note 38. 
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rogue,”125 which is desirable for the environment in which bribery 
occurs.  Using a “rogue to catch a rogue” means using someone on the 
inside of the illegal act to turn on his cohorts and provide information 
relating to the illegal act to the enforcement agency. 
As one commentator notes, “Bribery takes place in the shadows.  It 
may never be visible to anyone but the immediate actors.”126  Generally, 
those with insider information about the bribery are in the best position 
to come forward with their knowledge.  Whistleblowers “are in a unique 
position to deter and detect noncompliant behavior,”127 and qui tam 
provisions allow whistleblowers to utilize their unique position to 
enforce the law. 
Commentators believe that the FCA’s qui tam provision can be 
replicated in other areas,128 such as protecting national financial 
markets.129  According to one scholar, qui tam actions are the only 
existing “private justice” model that is effective.130  Qui tam actions 
have a proven track record for detecting and prosecuting low-visibility 
crimes, and a qui tam provision in the FCPA could achieve success on 
par with the FCA’s qui tam provision given the similarities between the 
underlying crimes that both statutes punish. 
C. A Qui Tam Provision Leverages the Strengths of Whistleblowers 
Better Than Dodd–Frank’s Whistleblower Statute Can 
A qui tam provision is the mechanism that best leverages the power 
of the government with the resources and value of the whistleblower.131  
By denying enforcement power to the whistleblower in Dodd–Frank, 
Congress passed a statute that ignores what has been undeniably 
successful in the FCA.  Congress also ignored an opportunity to give a 
 
 125. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 955–56 (1863) (remarks of Mr. Howard). 
 126. Daniel K Tarullo, The Limits of Institutional Design: Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 665, 689 (2004). 
 127. Ventry, supra note 101, at 382; see also HELMER, supra note 28, § 2-3 (“[Q]ui tam 
action . . . [is] an invaluable aid in detecting and prosecuting low-visibility offenses.”) (citation omitted). 
 128. See, e.g., Ventry, supra note 101 (tax); Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform 
Litigation: Deputizing Private Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384 
(2000) (civil rights); Peter S. Menell, Economic Implications of State Sovereign Immunity from 
Infringement of Federal Intellectual Property Rights, 33 LOY. L. A. L. REV 1399, 1444 (2000) 
(intellectual property rights); Catherine T. Struve, The FDA and the Tort System: Postmarketing 
Surveillance, Compensation, and the Role of Litigation, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 587 
(2005) (surveillance of potentially harmful drugs). 
 129. Bucy, supra note 35, at 76 (“The qui tam FCA private justice model should be expanded to 
cover protection of . . . national financial markets.”). 
 130. Id. at 79 (“This Article argues that only one existing private justice model, the qui tam action 
in the FCA . . . is effective.”). 
 131. See id. at 58–59. 
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needed supplement to the enforcement agencies’ limited resources.132 
Whistleblower programs that leave enforcement power solely with 
the government have not matched the success that qui tam suits have 
enjoyed, as demonstrated by examples from the SEC and IRS 
whistleblower programs.133  Enforcement agencies are unable to match 
the resolve and resources of private individuals with prosecution 
capabilities.  This is one of the reasons courts found an implied right of 
action in many securities laws—because the government lacks sufficient 
resources to adequately enforce its laws.134  Further, given that 
whistleblowers are often victims themselves,135 they have a connection 
to the crime, and their motivation often far exceeds that of the SEC and 
DOJ.136  These intangibles make the whistleblower a truly ardent 
prosecutor. 
History shows that allowing private citizens to sue on behalf of the 
government, and not just provide a tip, leads to better enforcement of the 
law.  Both in England and the United States, qui tam actions have long 
been employed when government enforcement was insufficient.137 
As one Senator stated during hearings regarding the FCA in the 
 
 132. See id. at 53 (stating that qui tam in the FCA has been “extraordinarily successful as a 
regulatory tool” and discussing the reasons why). 
 133. The IRS whistleblower program and the SEC whistleblower program have been criticized for 
being ineffective, see, for example, Michelle M. Kwon, Whistling Dixie About the IRS Whistleblower 
Program Thanks to the IRC Confidentiality Restrictions, 29 VA. TAX REV. 447, 451 (2010) (stating that 
the prior IRS whistleblower program was underused and ineffective); Ken Barry, New Report from the 
GAO Flags Problems with the IRS Whistleblower Program, ACCOUNTINGWEB (Sept. 21, 2011), 
http://www.accountingweb.com/topic/tax/new-report-gao-flags-problems-irs-whistleblower-program 
(detailing GAO criticisms to the newly revamped IRS whistleblower program); ASSESSMENT OF THE 
SEC’S BOUNTY PROGRAM, supra note 88 (finding original SEC whistleblower program ineffective). 
 134. See deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1230 (10th Cir. 1970) (“[P]rivate 
enforcement of the security laws is necessary due to the limited resources of the SEC.”). 
 135. Far too frequently the whistleblowers themselves are subject to retaliation as a result of 
coming forward.  See, e.g., Rebecca L. Dobias, Amending the Whistleblower Protection Act: Will 
Federal Employees Finally Speak Without Fear?, 13 FED. CIR. B.J. 117, 117 (2003) (stating a study 
found one in fourteen federal employees experienced retaliation after whistleblowing); Whistleblower 
Woes, 271 SCIENCE 35, 35 (Jan. 5, 1996), available at 
http://www.sciencemag.org/content/271/5245/35.full.pdf (finding two-thirds of scientific 
whistleblowers experience negative consequences for their actions, including one in four losing their 
job). 
 136. The employees of the SEC and DOJ do not have the kind of first-hand experience with the 
crime, nor will they have been retaliated against.  A troubling concern that some commentators have 
suggested is that the SEC’s motivations for enforcing crimes against major companies is questionable as 
SEC employees often work for these same major companies following their SEC employment, see, for 
example, William D. Cohan, Destruction at the SEC?, BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 1, 2011), 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/destruction-at-the-sec-09012011.html (arguing for a 
termination and restart to the SEC as it has “long had a too-cozy relationship with Wall Street”). 
 137. See HELMER, supra note 28, §§ 2-1, 2-2 (“William Holdsworth, a leading English historian, 
[said] the reason for the development of qui tam provisions was that England had no organized police 
force or system of inspectors, so the Government needed to enlist [whistleblowers].”) (citing 4 
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (3d ed. 1923). 
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1940s, “What harm can there be if 10,000 lawyers in America are 
assisting the Attorney General of the United States in digging up war 
frauds?”138  The same can be said within the context of the FCPA.  Is 
there harm from having 10,000 lawyers assisting the DOJ and SEC in 
detecting and deterring foreign bribery?139  From an enforcement 
perspective, there is likely no harm. 
D. A Qui Tam Provision Could Help Clarify and Establish the 
Parameters of the Ambiguous FCPA 
Under the current FCPA enforcement environment, the DOJ and SEC 
have been criticized for basing their prosecutions on dubious and 
untested theories,140 yet businesses have not challenged these theories in 
court, as it often makes more sense for them to reach a settlement with 
the enforcement agencies.141  These settlements do not get scrutinized by 
the courts.142  As a result, the enforcement agencies act as “the 
prosecutor, judge, and jury” in any given case.143  Wielding this 
enforcement power, the FCPA has been interpreted to mean whatever 
these agencies have determined it to mean.144  The lack of judicial 
review is a problem within the FCPA; the “view that something means 
whatever one chooses it to mean makes for enjoyable reading, but bad 
law.”145  Some believe that the FCPA, as an ambiguous statute, has 
made for bad law.146 
If the paradigm of enforcement were to shift, with individual 
plaintiffs bringing suit on behalf of the government, then cases may 
 
 138. HELMER, supra note 28, § 5-5(a), 294 n.37 (citing 89 CONG. REC. 7607 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 
1943) (remarks of Sen. Langer)). 
 139. Perhaps FCPA qui tam litigation would be an ideal area for jobless law school graduates to 
pursue!  See Nathan Koppel, U.S. News: Bar Raised for Law-Grad Jobs—Employment Prospects Dim 
as Firms Retrench, Derailing Career Paths for Many, WALL ST. J., May 6, 2010, at A3 (discussing 
bleak job market for recent law graduates). 
 140. See Koehler, supra note 41. 
 141. Id. at 929. 
 142. Id. at 929–30. 
 143. Michael Volkov, The FCPA & “Voluntary Disclosure”: An Enigmatic Threat to Due 
Process, 20 WLF LEGAL OPINION LETTER (Oct. 7, 2011), available at 
http://www.wlf.org/Upload/legalstudies/legalopinionletter/10-7-11Volkov_LegalOpinionLetter.pdf. 
 144. Cortney C. Thomas, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Decade of Rapid Expansion 
Explained, Defended, and Justified, 29 REV. LITIG. 439, 457 (2010) (“[P]rosecutors have had near-
unfettered abilities to push the prosecutorial envelope, creating new tools by means of diversion 
agreements and broadening the scope of the Act.”). 
 145. Harrington Mfg. Co. v. White, 475 F.2d 788, 797–98 n.6 (5th Cir. 1973) (discussing the 
difficulty of patent claim construction). 
 146. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 59 at 861 (“[T]he legislation ambiguously defines prohibited 
conduct and its provisions lack an adequate standard by which to determine the nature of contemplated 
activity”). 
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actually be litigated before a judge.147  While the DOJ and SEC have 
large “carrots and sticks” at their disposal to persuade companies to 
settle,148 individual plaintiffs do not.  Under the proposal in this 
Comment, individuals would have to litigate in the courts. 
Litigation could led to an increased amount of case law that might 
clarify the myriad of ambiguities that currently afflict the FCPA, 
assuming that litigation actually clarifies law rather than creates further 
ambiguity.  It could be true that attorneys may intentionally try to create 
ambiguity, but determining the meaning of a particular term or terms in 
a statute can be achieved through litigation.  For example, in United 
States v. Kay, one of the few FCPA cases that went to trial, the meaning 
of the business nexus element of the FCPA was clarified.149 
The idea that qui tam actions would bring an increased amount of 
case law may be criticized under the following circumstances: where the 
individual plaintiff brings suit and the government joins in the litigation.  
In such circumstances, the company may choose to settle given the 
aforementioned incentives the government has at its disposal.150  Such a 
result would receive little, if any, judicial review, leaving the case law 
neither better nor worse.  However, if the FCA’s rapid expansion of 
cases following significant strengthening of its qui tam provision is any 
indication of what might result in the FCPA, the concern that case law 
will not expand under this Comment’s proposal is unlikely to 
materialize.151 
E. A Qui Tam Provision Represents Sound Public Policy in the FCPA 
Professor Mike Koehler, a leading FCPA scholar and blogger, has 
opined that Dodd–Frank as applied to the FCPA represents bad public 
 
 147. The FCA’s qui tam provision is illustrative.  In the early 1980s government contractor fraud 
was estimated to have been costing the government $50 billion a year, yet few, if any, cases were being 
brought. See Sean Hamer, Lincoln’s Law: Constitutional and Policy Issues Posed by the Qui Tam 
Provisions of the False Claims Act, 6 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 89, 89 (1997).  Following significant 
strengthening of the qui tam provision with the 1986 amendments to the act, the qui tam relators were 
able to recover those billions that would have otherwise been lost to fraud.  See Sydney Strickland, A 
Policy-Based Solution to the False Claim Act’s Faulty Incent Structure, 35 J. LEGAL PROF. 449, 459 
(2011); see also Joseph E.B. White, U.S. False Claims Act: Deputizing the Public to Combat Fraud, 38 
FALSE CLAIMS ACT & QUI TAM Q. REV. 17 (2005) (showing statistics that since 1986, thousands of qui 
tam cases has been filed). 
 148. Koehler, supra note 41, at 924–30. 
 149. 359 F.3d 738, 761 (5th Cir. 2004) (finding that the business nexus element did not go to the 
FCPA’s “core of criminality”). 
 150. See Koehler, supra note 41, at 924–30. 
 151. See HELMER, supra note 28, at xi–xii (discussing how in 1984 the author could read every 
opinion dealing with the FCA in less than 2 hours, but that following the 1986 amendments over 5,000 
cases had been filed). 
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policy.152  Professor Koehler would likely find the inclusion of a qui tam 
provision within the FCPA to also represent bad public policy.153  
According to the argument of Professor Koehler, “A settled SEC FCPA 
enforcement action does not necessarily represent the triumph of the 
SEC’s legal position over the company’s . . . but rather reflects a risk-
based decision primarily grounded in issues other than facts and the 
law.”154  Professor Koehler asserts that because of this risk-based 
decision making and the fact that the FCPA crimes are “enforced like no 
other security violation,” it does not make sense to punish corporations 
for behavior whose legality cannot be determined given the parameters 
of the FCPA.155 
This argument, taken to its logical conclusion, would argue against 
any sort of enforcement of the FCPA, as the parameters of the law have 
never been firmly established.  The statute has been described as 
ambiguous since the beginning of its existence.156  According to the 
DOJ, the statute’s ambiguity may actually be necessary flexibility to 
take into account the nature of foreign bribery.157  If the parameters must 
be completely delineated prior to enforcement, the statute may never be 
useable. 
What is unaccounted for in Professor Koehler’s argument is the role 
that qui tam provisions can play in establishing the parameters of the 
law.158  Including a qui tam provision is sound public policy, 
notwithstanding the lack of parameters the current FCPA provides.  In 
fact, the lack of parameters is all the more reason for the law to adopt a 
qui tam provision.  Ambiguous statutes are nothing new, and where 
legislatures have failed to thoroughly articulate parameters of a law, 
courts have fulfilled that role.159  It is axiomatic that the “province and 
 
 152. See Letter from Mike Koehler, Professor Butler Univ. to Securities and Exchange 
Commission (Sept. 3, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/df-title-
ix/whistleblower/whistleblower-10.htm [hereinafter Letter to SEC from Mike Koehler].  Professor Mike 
Koehler runs a blog http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/ and has testified before Congress in regards to 
enforcement the FCPA. 
 153. E-mail from Mike Koehler, Assistant Professor of Business Law, Butler Univ., to author 
(Aug. 11, 2011 12:27 EST) (on file with author). 
 154. See Letter to SEC from Mike Koehler, supra note 152. 
 155. See id. 
 156. See supra notes 59–61 and the citations therein. 
 157. For example, Greg Andres, acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General argued that the “law’s 
treatment of foreign officials needed to be flexible to account for the various governments around the 
world.”  See Joe Palazzolo, Sensenbrenner Will Introduce FCPA Bill, WALL ST. J. BLOG (June 14, 
2011) http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2011/06/14/sensenbrenner-will-introduce-fcpa-bill/ 
(emphasis added). 
 158. See supra Part IV.D. 
 159. See Elizabeth R. Baldwin, Note, Damage Control: Staking Claim to Employment Law 
Remedies for Undocumented Immigrant Workers After Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 27 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 233, 264 (2003) (“[W]hen Congress has drafted an ambiguous statute, our system 
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duty of the judicial department [is] to say what the law is.”160  Our 
system of common law is designed to expound upon statutes.  As such, 
qui tam litigation could provide a viable mechanism for courts to 
delineate the parameters of the FCPA. 
Buttressing the policy argument in favor of a qui tam provision within 
the FCPA is the effect qui tam actions have on reinforcing American 
democratic principles.  “[C]itizen involvement in the enforcement of 
public policy confirms the importance of the individual to the 
functioning of an effective democracy.”161   
Studies have shown whistleblowers’ motivations reflect four themes: 
integrity, altruism or public safety, justice, and self-preservation.162  
These are the kinds of social norms that the United States should seek to 
foster.  A qui tam action allows the type of citizen involvement that 
creates a successful outcome for the government, the individual, and 
society generally.  “People will have more faith in a system that they 
feel they have more influence over,” and “corrupt acts will be deterred 
as a result of the qui tam actions . . . .”163  Accordingly, strong public 
policy favors adding a qui tam provision within the FCPA. 
F. A Qui Tam Provision Could Be More Equitable for Businesses Than 
Dodd–Frank 
Dodd–Frank’s “lottery mentality”164 has made the whistleblower 
provision controversial and unpalatable to businesses.  While the general 
hostility of businesses towards whistleblowers is unlikely to disappear 
completely, the model represented by qui tam actions is one that 
businesses could at least find more equitable. 
A qui tam plaintiff must actually confront the business in a lawsuit, 
reveal their identity, and substantiate their claims while exerting greater 
thought and effort than Dodd–Frank whistleblowers.  In other words, a 
qui tam plaintiff actually has “skin in the game,” as compared to a 
Dodd–Frank whistleblower.165  As between an invested and transparent 
 
of separation of powers mandates that courts interpret what the law says.”); see also Joseph A. 
Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity in 
Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627 (2002) (discussing the value in legislatures 
drafting ambiguous statutes). 
 160. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 161. CLAIRE M. SYLVIA, THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT: FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT § 1:13 
(2011). 
 162. Aaron Kesselheim et al., Whistle-Blowers Experiences in Fraud Litigation Against 
Pharmaceutical Companies, 362:19 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1832 (May 13, 2010). 
 163. Petty, supra note 64, at 876. 
 164. Hartmann, supra note 104, at 1303–13. 
 165. See Ebersole, supra note 3, at 162–63; see also supra Part III.B.3. 
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qui tam relator and a stealth whistleblower with a lottery mentality, it 
would seem that the business should favor the qui tam relator. 
The reality for businesses is that Dodd–Frank is on the books and 
likely to remain there for the foreseeable future.166  Amending the FCPA 
to include a qui tam provision will cause minimal or no harm to 
businesses as they will already have in place compliance controls in 
response to Dodd–Frank.  As commentators have suggested, in response 
to Dodd–Frank businesses should: (1) update internal controls and ethics 
programs to include educating and training employees, (2) ensure proper 
reporting procedures are in place, and (3) respond quickly to potential 
misconduct.167  These measures are precisely what would need to be 
done if the FCPA were to adopt a qui tam provision.  Since businesses 
likely will have already implemented these measures as a result of 
Dodd–Frank, businesses will suffer no additional costs. 
Some critics may argue that a qui tam provision in the FCPA would 
result in increased litigation and meritless claims, thereby imposing 
additional costs.168  This argument was made with the FCA, but the FCA 
qui tam experience has shown results that go against what critics 
believed: the rate of meritless qui tam claims was roughly equal to that 
of civil claims overall.169  Furthermore, mechanisms similar to those 
included within the FCA can be included within the revised FCPA 
statute to minimize frivolous claims.170  Minimizing frivolous lawsuits 
can also be accomplished by the enforcement agencies actively 
supervising the qui tam suits.171 
A qui tam action represents a better model than Dodd–Frank’s 
whistleblower provision because the qui tam plaintiff must actually 
make efforts to substantiate their allegations and are financially, 
emotionally, and physically tied to their claims.  It is unlike “playing the 
 
 166. The statute includes a provision for Congress to be kept informed of its utility, see 15 
U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(g)(5) (West 2010). 
 167. See JORDAN ETH ET AL., COPING WITH THE NEW DODD–FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER RULES, 
1904 PLI/CORP 257, 275–76 (2011). 
 168. See William E. Kovacic, Whistleblower Bounty Lawsuits As Monitoring Devices in 
Government Contracting, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1799, 1825 (1996) (“Decentralized enforcement 
systems can generate excessive litigation, elicit substantial numbers of nuisance suits, and provide tools 
by which firms strategically use the courts to impede efficient behavior by rivals.”) (internal citations 
omitted); Paula J. Zimmerman, Note, The Sequoia Significance: The Role of the Civil False Claims 
Act’s Dismissal Provision in Procurement Reform, 29 PUB. CONT. L.J. 329, 345 (2000) (“As more [qui 
tam] suits are being filed, it is inevitable that there are more meritless suits among them.”). 
 169. See Law and Transnational Corruption, supra note 64, at 130. 
 170. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(4) (2006) (“If the government does not proceed with the action 
and the person bringing the action conducts the action, the court may award to the defendant its 
reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses if the defendant prevails in the action and the court finds that 
the claim of the person bringing the action was clearly frivolous, clearly vexatious, or brought primarily 
for purposes of harassment.”). 
 171. See Bucy, supra note 35, at 74.  
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lottery” in that it requires more than simply reporting a company’s 
potential violation to the SEC.  Further, a qui tam provision likely poses 
no additional costs to businesses.  As such, a qui tam provision should 
be preferred by businesses over what Dodd–Frank currently affords. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The time is now for Congress to amend the FCPA.  Several 
individuals have recently testified before Congress suggesting that the 
statute be revised, and congressional leaders have mulled 
amendments.172  Congressman Jim Sensenbrenner, the American Bar 
Association, and the Chamber of Commerce, among others, have all 
shown a desire to see the statute reformed.173 
If the FCPA is amended, Congress should include a qui tam provision 
within the revised FCPA.  The storied qui tam provision has an 
extensive history of providing a viable mechanism for assisting 
enforcement when the underlying crimes were difficult to detect and 
government resources were scarce.  Qui tam actions have a proven track 
record of being one of the most successful government programs174 that 
actually returns money to the Treasury Department each year. 
While businesses and some commentators may think that Dodd–
Frank’s whistleblower provision has gone too far, this is simply not true 
as applied to the FCPA.  Dodd–Frank’s whistleblower provision did not 
go far enough, and adopting a qui tam provision is the solution.  
Finally, anyone concerned about including a qui tam provision within 
the FCPA should heed the words of Greg Andres, acting United States 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General: “Our view is if companies aren’t 
paying bribes, then they don’t have anything to worry about.”175  If 
companies or individuals are not bribing foreigners, then should it really 




 172. See supra note 62. 
 173. See FCPA PROFESSOR, http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/category/fcpa-reform (last visited Feb. 
18, 2012) (containing content that is updated frequently and an archive of blog posts from FCPA 
Professor Mike Koehler relating to reforming the FCPA). 
 174. The term “government program” is used loosely in this sentence to recognize that qui tam 
provision allows private citizens to sue on the government’s behalf, and in this sense, functions as a 
program for the benefit of the government. 
 175. Palazzolo, supra note 157. 
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